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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k).

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The sole issue to be decided on appeal is whether Valley Bank
and Dime Savings were transacting business under a common name and,
as such, can be sued by that name.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
As the trial court granted

defendant's motion

to dismiss

plaintiff's complaint, which motion was treated as one for summary
judgment since matters outside the pleading were considered,1 the
applicable standard of review is that set forth in Rule 56(c), Utah
R. Civ. P.:
[Whether] the pleadings, depositions, answers
to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Id.; see also Rule 12(b)(stating that if, on a motion to dismiss
pursuant

to

Rule

12(b)(6),

matters

x

outside

the

pleading

are

Recognizing that the motion would be treated as one for
summary judgment, defendant moved the court to dismiss plaintiff's
complaint pursuant to both Rules 12(b)(6) and 56, Utah R. Civ. P.
(R. 6)
1

considered,

the

motion

shall

be

treated

as

one

for

summary

judgment).

DETERMINATIVE RULE
The determinative rule of civil procedure applicable to this
case is Rule 17(d), which provides in pertinent part as follows:
When two or more persons associated in any business
either as a joint-stock company, a partnership or other
association, not a corporation, transact such business
under a common name, whether it comprises the names of
such associates or not, they may sue or be sued by such
common name.
Utah R. Civ. P. 17(d).

NATURE OF CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On

November

24,

1992,

shortly

before

the

statute

of

limitations applicable to this case had run, plaintiff brought suit
against

"Willowcreek Plaza."

(R. 8)

Plaintiff alleged that

on

December 31, 1988, while on her way to her chiropractor's, she had
slipped and fallen at the Willow Creek Plaza, a professional office
complex. (JEd. ) A copy of the summons and complaint was served upon
one of the managers of Willow Creek Plaza, L.C., which currently
owns the office complex. (R. 8-9)
Willow Creek Plaza, L.C., however, did not own the complex on
the date of plaintiff's fall, so it filed a motion to dismiss
plaintiff's complaint. (R. 9)

It argued that it had not acquired
2

title to the property until November 8, 1991, nearly three years
after the fall, and that at the time of the accident the property
was owned by Valley Bank and Trust Company. (JGL ) Valley Bank had
acquired title to the property on November 16, 1988, by virtue of
a foreclosure action, and had conveyed the property to Wilford W.
Goodwill and Dorothy P. Goodwill on September 4, 1991, and they in
turn had transferred title to their company, Willow Creek Plaza,
L.C. (Id.)
The motion to dismiss was based on two grounds. First, Willow
Creek Plaza, L . C , argued that absent ownership of the property, it
could not be sued for plaintiff's accident.

(.Id,.)

Second, it

argued that "Willowcreek Plaza" was simply the name of the complex
where plaintiff fell, and was not a legal entity, separate from
Willow Creek Plaza, L . C , subject to suit. (Id. )
Plaintiff responded to the motion by arguing that, although
process had mistakenly been served on Willow Creek Plaza, L . C , the
complaint should not be dismissed.
Bank and Trust

Plaintiff argued that Valley

Company, which owned

the complex, and

another

financial institution, Dime Savings Bank of New York, were doing
business as "Willowcreek Plaza," and accordingly, could be sued by
that common name pursuant to Rule 17(d), Utah R. Civ. P. (Id.)
The court, however, dismissed plaintiff's complaint. (id.) It
ruled that even if Valley Bank and Dime Savings were doing business
3

as "Willowcreek Plaza," since plaintiff had not served them with
process, and more than 120 days had elapsed since the filing of the
complaint, the court had no personal jurisdiction over them and it
could not decide whether

they were

"Willowcreek Plaza." (R. 9-10)

in fact doing business as

The court, therefore, dismissed the

case without prejudice, giving plaintiff an opportunity to refile
the

action,

notwithstanding

the

tolling

of

the

statute

of

limitations, under the savings statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40.
(R. 10)
Plaintiff

refiled the case on September

17, 1993. (R. 2)

Again, she named "Willowcreek Plaza" as defendant. (Id,.)

She had

process served on Valley Bank,2 and Valley Bank moved to dismiss
the complaint on the ground that it and Dime Savings had not at any
time done business as "Willowcreek Plaza." (R. 6-57)

Judge Rokich

ruled that Valley Bank and Dime Savings were not doing business as
"Willowcreek Plaza" and granted the motion. (R. 82)

Although this

dismissal, too, was without prejudice, since plaintiff had already
refiled once under the savings statute, and the savings statute
only allows for one refiling, Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Utah
State University, 813 P.2d 1216, 1221 n. 10 (Utah Ct. App. 1991),
plaintiff took this appeal. (R. 103-04; 106-07)
2

The return of service is not part of the record and was
apparently not filed with the clerk of the court by plaintiff's
counsel.
4

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
In December of 1984, Valley Bank and Trust Company made a $3.5
million construction loan to Willow Creek Shopping Village, Ltd.,
for the construction of the Willow Creek Plaza professional office
complex. (R. 10)
into

what

is

Prior to making the loan, Valley Bank entered

commonly

known

in

the

banking

industry

as

a

"participation agreement" with Dime Savings Bank of New York. (Id. )
Pursuant to the participation agreement, Valley Bank sold to Dime
Savings an undivided 80% interest in the loan. (Id.)
Willow Creek Shopping Village subsequently defaulted on the
loan,

and

Valley

Bank

instituted

foreclosure

proceedings,

eventually obtaining a sheriff's deed to the property on November
16, 1988. (Id.)
As owner of the premises, Valley Bank thereafter entered into
various leases with tenants of the complex. (R. 11)

All of the

leases were executed by Valley Bank in the name of "Valley Bank and
Trust Company." (Jld. ; see also R. 38-57.)
Pursuant to the participation agreement, 80% of the rents
derived by Valley Bank were paid to Dime Savings. (R. 11)

At no

time, however, did Valley Bank and Dime Savings transact business
as "Willowcreek Plaza" or under any other common name. (Id.)

All

business transacted at the Willow Creek Plaza office complex was
transacted in the name of Valley Bank alone. (Id.)
5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly granted defendant's motion to dismiss
plaintiff's complaint as Valley Bank and Dime Savings, even though
they may have been associated in a business together, were not
transacting such business under a common name as is required by
Rule 17(d), Utah R. Civ. P.

ARGUMENT
I.
Since Valley Bank and Dime Savings were not transacting
business together as "Willowcreek Plaza/' they may not be
sued in such name.
Plaintiff spends much time in her brief, as she did in the
court

below,

arguing

that

Valley

Bank

and

Dime

Savings

were

transacting business together. Before Valley Bank and Dime Savings
may be sued by a common name, however, plaintiff must prove that
not only were they transacting business together, but that they
were transacting such business under a common name.

Rule 17(d),

Utah R. Civ. P., provides:

When two or more persons associated
either as a joint-stock company,
association, not a corporation,
under a common name, whether it
such associates or not, they may
common name.

6

in any

business

a partnership or other
transact
such
business
comprises the names of
sue or be sued by such

(Emphasis added).

Valley Bank and Dime Savings were no doubt

associated in a business together, but they were not transacting
business under a common name as required by Rule 17(d).
Plaintiff' sole argument for the proposition that Valley Bank
and Dime Savings were transacting business under a common name is
that the office complex was known as "Willowcreek Plaza."

She

points the Court to the leases entered into with tenants.

The

leases, however, variously refer to the complex as the "Willow
Creek

Shopping

Village,"

the

"Willow

Creek

Plaza

Executive

Offices," and the "Willow Creek Plaza Development," in addition to
"Willow Creek Plaza."3 (R. 38-57)

Certainly, not all these are

business names of Valley Bank and Dime Savings.

"Willowcreek

Plaza," as indicated in the affidavit of Brad Baldwin and Wilford
Goodwill, previously filed in the first action, is simply the name
of the office complex.

It is not a separate legal entity subject

to suit and it is not the d/b/a of Valley Bank and Dime Savings.
Accepting plaintiff's argument would mean that any time a
business which owns a building gives it a name, that is the d/b/a
of the business. Defense counsel, however, has been unable to find
any cases, in this jurisdiction or others, so holding. Defense

3

The addendum to the participation agreement upon which
plaintiff relies further indicates that the property is simply
known as the "Willow Creek Shopping Village."
7

counsel has been unable to find one case where such an argument has
even been raised.
In order

to

constitute

entities must actually

a d/b/af

"do" business

implies: "doing business as,"

it would

seem

that

the

together, as the acronym

Naming a building simply does not

constitute "doing" business. When Valley Bank and Dime Savings did
do business together, by entering into leases with tenants, they
always did so in the name of Valley Bank.

None of the leases was

signed "Valley Bank and Trust Company, d/b/a "Willowcreek Plaza,"
or "Valley Bank and Trust Company and Dime Savings Bank of New
York, d/b/a Willowcreek Plaza."

On the contrary, all business done

at the Willow Creek Plaza office complex was done in the name of
Valley Bank alone.
Because Valley Bank and Dime Savings were not doing business
as "Willowcreek Plaza," much less under any other common name, they
may not be sued by that name.

It is unfortunate perhaps for

plaintiff that it is now too late for her to name Valley Bank;
however, as the Court is aware, a simple title search would have
revealed the name of the property owner, which plaintiff's counsel
obviously did not do.

8

II.
Plaintiff had an opportunity to conduct discovery in the
court below had she wished.
Plaintiff further argues that she "never had an opportunity to
pursue discovery . . . to determine what, if any, other documents
or material existed to demonstrate that Dime Savings and Valley
[Bank] were

transacting

Willowcreek Plaza."

[business]

under

the

common

name

of

Brief of Appellant at 11. Plaintiff, however,

never raised this argument in the court below, and should not be
permitted to do so on appeal.

In Onq International (U.S.A.), Inc.

v. 11th Avenue Corporation, 850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993), the Supreme
Court stated that issues and arguments not raised in the court
below may not be considered on appeal.

J[d. at 455 n. 31.

In any event, plaintiff did have an opportunity to conduct
discovery had she wished.

Rule 56(f), Utah R. Civ. P., allows a

party who is unable to "present . . . facts essential" to oppose a
motion to file an affidavit indicating what discovery he or she
would

like to do

and

request

that

the hearing

Plaintiff did not file such an affidavit.

be

continued.

Nor did she ever, at any

time in the court below, request an opportunity to do discovery or
complain

that

discovery.

she

did

not

have

an

opportunity

to

engage

in

Plaintiff should not now be heard to argue on appeal

that she "never had an opportunity to pursue discovery."

9

CONCLUSION
The order of dismissal of the trial court should be affirmed.

DATED this

zz

lay of July, 1994.
MORGAN

HANSEN
for Defendant and
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing
BRIEF OF APPELLEE were mailed, postage prepaid, on July off/
1994, to the following:
Brian S. King
KING & ISAACSON
4 Triad Center, Suite 825
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
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